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Abstract
Background: The need to provide quality and equitable health services and protect populations from impoverishing
health care costs has pushed universal health coverage (UHC) to the top of global health policy agenda. In many
developing countries where the majority of the population works in the informal sector, there are critical debates
over the best financing mechanisms to progress towards UHC. In Kenya, government health policy has prioritized
contributory financing strategy (social health insurance) as the main financing mechanism for UHC. However, there are
currently no studies that have assessed the cost of either social health insurance (SHI) as the contributory approach or
an alternative financing mechanism involving non-contributory (general tax funding) approaches to UHC in Kenya.
The aim of this study was to critically assess the financial requirements of both contributory and non-contributory
mechanisms to financing UHC in Kenya in the context of large informal sector populations.
Methods: SimIns Basic® model, Version 2.1, 2008 (WHO/GTZ), was used to assess the feasibility of UHC in Kenya and
provide estimates of financial resource needs for UHC over a 17-year period (2013–2030). Data sources included review
of national and international literature on inflation, demography, macro-economy, health insurance, health services unit
costs and utilization rates. The data were triangulated across geographic regions for accuracy and integrity of the
simulation. SimIns models for 10 years only so data from the final year of the model was used to project for another
7 years. The 17-year period was necessary because the Government of Kenya aims to achieve UHC by 2030.
Results and conclusions: The results show that SHI is financially sustainable (Sustainability in this study is used to
mean that expenditure does not outstrip revenue.) (revenues and expenditure match) within the first five years of
implementation, but it becomes less sustainable with time. Modelling for a non-contributory scenario, on the other
hand, showed greater sustainability both in the short- and long-term. The financial resource requirements for universal
access to health care through general government revenue are compared with a contributory health insurance
scheme approach. Although both funding options would require considerable government subsidies, given the
magnitude of the informal sector in Kenya and their limited financial capacity, a tax-funded system would be less
costly and more sustainable in the long-term than an insurance scheme approach. However, more innovative
financing for health care as well as giving the health sector higher priority in government expenditure will be required
to make the non-contributory financing mechanism more sustainable.
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Background
Universal health coverage (UHC) is a priority policy agenda
worldwide and is one of the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs). The SDG3, where UHC falls, is driven by
the need for improved access to quality health services for
all and protection of the population from catastrophic and
impoverishing health care costs. Access to health care ser-
vices should be equitable and sustainable, based on need
and not ability to pay [1]. The design of health financing
systems has important implications for UHC. Countries
that finance their health systems predominantly through
mandatory prepayments including contributory (social
health insurance) and non-contributory mechanisms
(general government revenues), make faster progress to
UHC [2]. The World Health Organization (WHO) [1]
regards mandatory prepayment as the most efficient and
equitable financing system for UHC. Mandatory prepay-
ment for services are preferred because they potentially
generate high revenue, promote risk and income cross-
subsidization and minimize financial barriers to access [3].
Because they tend to include the entire population or a
large majority of it, mandatory prepayment systems ad-
dress problems of adverse selection, are financially secure
and benefit from economies of scale as well as contribute
to the improvement of equity in the distribution of health
resources [4, 5]. Moreover, they are domestic financing
sources and this makes them more sustainable and predict-
able for the long term.
A critical point for countries that are reforming their
health systems to progress to UHC is the need to con-
sider total resource requirements over the long term to
plan for the implementation and sustainable financing of
UHC. The decision on the appropriate mix of financing
mechanisms should be informed by evidence particularly
on the feasibility of their revenue generating potential,
over a period of time to allow for long-term planning
and budgeting.
In Kenya, the importance of financial protection to
UHC cannot be overemphasized. About 83% of Kenyans
lack financial protection from health care costs, and
about 1.5 million Kenyans are pushed into poverty each
year as a result of paying for health care [6]. The Kenyan
Government is committed to moving towards UHC and
is currently developing a health financing strategy that
will provide an overarching policy framework for health
financing reforms. Ongoing policy discussions indicate
that mandatory health insurance, where both formal and
informal sector workers pay a premium into a national
pool, will be the predominant health financing me-
chanism for Kenya. However, questions have recently
been raised regarding the feasibility of a contributory ap-
proach in settings with large informal sector populations
for various reasons including: the difficulty of determin-
ing incomes of informal sector workers; appropriate
premium rates; how to enforce contributions and ensure
that revenue collection mechanisms are administratively
efficient. Besides, even if incomes were determinable in
the informal sector, the premium contributions would
be very onerous because of generally low-incomes in the
sector. The experiences of Thailand and Ghana confirm
that determining incomes and identifying the poor in
the informal sector are problematic [7, 8]. Universal
health coverage has major monetary implications for the
government, firms and households which need to be
considered over the long-term. It is important to con-
sider all financing approaches for UHC to arrive at a
strategy that has the lowest possible costs, equitably
distributes the financing burden and ensures equity of
access to services. Before Kenya disregards possibilities
of funding the health system through a non-contribution
model it is important to assess the resource potential of
a tax funded system, as an alternative to the contribu-
tory approach. This paper models the resource require-
ments of the two financing approaches to UHC, and
assesses their feasibility in the Kenyan context.
Methods
Simulation Insurance (SimIns) modelling
The feasibility of UHC in Kenya was modelled using
SimIns Basic® (GIZ/WHO). SimIns models for a 10 year
period, so the study first modelled from 2013 to 2023
and then used the 2023 data as second round input to
extend the model to 2030. Details on how SimIns Basic
works are provided in the User Guide [9]. As a conse-
quence of expanding coverage under a contributory
mechanism, health facilities will be expected to gradually
meet most of their expenses from payments by the
health insurance organization, meaning that there will
be less funds going directly from general government
revenue to support public sector facilities. In this con-
text, SimIns Basic is able to demonstrate the trend in
health insurance funding as it gradually replaces the flow
of government funds into public sector health facilities.
The aim of the simulation is therefore, to demonstrate
separately, the feasibility of UHC through (i) social
health insurance supplemented by government revenues
and, (ii) funding from general government revenues sup-
plemented by premium contributions from the formal
sector (given that mandatory contributions by the formal
sector already exist within Kenya).
Scenarios for financing UHC
In the proposed contributory financing policy, all
Kenyans including formal and informal sector workers,
pensioners and the indigent are required to belong and
contribute premiums into one pool. Within this pool,
formal and informal sector workers contribute pre-
miums on a regular basis whereas the government pays
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premiums for the indigent. Currently, those in the
informal sector who have voluntarily joined the NHIF
contribute a flat-rate of Kenya Shillings (KSh) 500 (about
US$ 5.00) per household on a monthly basis for
outpatient and inpatient services. Contributions from
the formal sector are currently based on salary scales
capped at a salary of KSh 100,000 (US$ 1,000) per
month. The contributions from the formal sector on
average represent about 2.4% of average gross pay. The
financing scenarios for UHC are described in Table 1.
The scenarios described are: (a) premium contributions
as the main financing strategy and (b) general govern-
ment revenues as the main financing strategy.
Expected future changes in disease burden from com-
municable to non-communicable diseases (NCDs) as
well as management of revenue and expenditure were
beyond this model. These however, are expected to have
some influence on health seeking behavior and health
care costs. To make up for these expected changes, the
model projections were benchmarked using data from
developing countries such as Thailand and Sri Lanka,
which have experienced transition from infectious dis-
eases to NCDs and have relatively well managed health
systems.
Data sources
The data sources included national health and economic
surveys of various developing countries and data bases
of international institutions such as the World Bank,
World Health Organization (WHO), Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A number of
reports and peer-reviewed journals also provided data
for the simulation. Key input data and assumptions were
based on various population parameters including
population growth rate, various population categories
(indigent, formal sector workers and informal sector
workers) as well as macroeconomic indicators, health-
care unit costs, health services utilization rates and
health insurance coverage (Tables 2 & 3).
More than simply inflation-rating unit costs from 2007
to 2030, we used a Ministry of Health task force in 2012
report that estimated that public facilities should get
about twice the funding that they currently receive to
improve service delivery to acceptable levels [10]. Such
rapid investment in the health sector may not be pos-
sible given past trends in funding from the government.
On this basis we can assume that, while funding for the
health sector may not more than double as recom-
mended by the taskforce, the funding would increase at
a rate twice higher than the prevailing inflation rates to
better approximate future unit costs and the need to an-
chor universal coverage. On this basis a 14.6% rate from
2007 to 2013 was used to estimate public provider unit
costs for base year 2013. Following a linear projection,
implementation of strategic purchasing as more people
get covered and coupled with competition from im-
proved services in the public sector will put pressure on
the private sector to have reasonable prices such that,
over a period of time, there would be a tendency
towards convergence of unit costs between public and
private services. On this basis it was assumed that
Table 1 Summary of two financing scenarios explored in the
SimIns basic model
Scenario 1: Contributory system: Social health insurance (SHI) scheme
This scenario mirrors the preferred government financing model for
UHC in which all Kenyans are expected to contribute premiums to a
scheme (SHI). This financing scenario retains most of the design features
of the current public insurer, the National Hospital Insurance Fund
(NHIF), which is the preferred government organization for UHC. Under
Scenario 1, government funding plays a complementary role to
premium contributions. With the majority of formal sector workers
already covered by the NHIF, the design of a future scheme is targeted
at gradually enrolling and retaining informal sector workers through a
mix of strategies including wireless premium payments and devolved
registration centers and an expanded benefits package. Some of these
strategies are already in place. Formal and informal sector workers are
expected to pay standardized premium rates but the government will
pay contributions for the indigent. It is not clear how the indigent will
be identified. All population groups are expected to be under a single
national pool with the aim of achieving universal population coverage
by 2030. The proposed benefit package is quite wide and includes basic
outpatient and inpatient services and maternity. Outpatient services
include consultation fees, laboratory investigation, drug administration
and radiological examination, among others. Inpatient services include
bed and theatre charges, nursing care, fees for personnel (physicians
and surgeons) and drugs, among others. Utilization of these services is
expected to increase gradually as more people are covered. There will
be no co-payments for using public sector facilities but those who
choose to use private sector services are expected to co-pay between
2% of the costs for low-cost private sector facilities to 90% of the cost
for high-end private facilities. Although the option of using private
providers with co-payments exists, there were proposals within the
NHIF to restrict NHIF services to public sector facilities only to address
cost-escalation. Should this be the case, there is expected to be pressure
to significantly improve the quality of public sector services which
currently are perceived to be of poor quality and lack value for money.
Scenario 2: Non-contributory system: predominantly tax funded system
Under the alternative scenario, government revenue is complemented
by the existing statutory premium deductions from formal sector
workers and pensioners. Specifically, general government revenues are
meant to provide coverage for informal sector workers and the
indigent population. Both government revenue and health insurance
contributions by formal sector workers will be pooled into the NHIF, which
will purchase services for the whole population. The non-contributory
scenario is expected to rapidly increase population coverage and utilization
of services and should therefore be accompanied with efforts to rapidly
improve public sector services. Public spending on health care is also
expected to grow rapidly to meet rising demand for health services for the
entire population. The benefit package considered is similar to the one in
Scenario 1, consisting of essential services but with emphasis on the use of
public sector facilities. Such restriction, as with the case with Thailand’s
universal coverage scheme [26], is expected to save costs more than it
would in a contributory system. The assumption is that there will be no
co-payments for those who use public facilities. On the other hand,
wealthier individuals are likely to use private services to complement those
that they are entitled to from the public sector.
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average unit costs for private facilities increased at half
the rate for public sector (i.e. 7.3%) from 2007 to 2013.
Limitations of SimIns
A notable limitation with SimIns is that it only models
for 10 years and although the modelling work extended
to 2030, there are problems in transition between the
two models especially with regard to financial estimates.
This was resolved by using a Microsoft Excel sheet to
calculate revenue and expenditure estimates based on
trends from 2013 to 2023. The other notable weakness
mainly with SimIns Basic is that it does not provide a
complete picture of the total health expenditure as it
does not include private health expenditure outside of
health facilities (e.g. on self-treatment).
Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis was conducted by adjusting contribu-
tion and government subsidy rates to address potential
deficits in both scenarios (Table 4).
Results
Overview of population coverage and service utilization
Population coverage and service utilization are important
influencers of costs. The modelling divided population
coverage into three different population groups: formal
sector workers, informal sector including the indigent
population, and pensioners. In both scenarios, coverage
for formal sector workers and pensioners follows a similar
pattern because it is more straightforward to enforce
membership through payroll deductions. It was assumed
that with strict laws on coverage and increased demand
for health insurance, every employer will be compelled to
comply with government regulations to declare 100% of
their workers. On the other hand, the coverage trends for
informal sector populations take different trajectories
under each scenario. Under the non-contributory scenario,
coverage of informal sector and indigent populations is
expected to increase to 98% in the second year of imple-
mentation because it targets everyone and is easier to
implement compared to the contributory scenario where
coverage increases gradually throughout the simulation
(2013–2030). The assumption underlying this level of
coverage is based on recent universal services in Kenya
including free maternity care and free primary care. The
latter has benefited all Kenyans within the first year of im-
plementation. Under the contributory scenario, population
coverage increases from 19.5% at the baseline to 68.5% in
the 10th year of implementation. About 98% population
coverage (universal coverage) is achieved in the 17th year
of implementation of the contributory system.
With regard to utilization of services, from a baseline of
3.1 OP visits per capita per year, the total utilization of OP
services across the population, on average, are projected at
about 4.00 annual visits per capita by 2023 and 4.31 annual
visits per capita at the end of the simulation. Inpatient days
per capita per year at the baseline were set at 0.25 as per
the most recent government survey [6] and projected to
increase to 0.27 in 2023 and 0.29 in 2030 (Table 5).
Table 3 Projected unit costs for OP visits and IP days per capita
per annum (Constant prices)
Facility Base year 2013 2023 2030
Dispensary (OP) 394.15 679.67 780.72
Health Centre (OP) 505.14 871.07 1000.58
County Hospital (OP) 1078.24 1859.32 2135.77
County Hospital (IP) 4610.83 7950.93 9133.12
National Hospital (OP) 3191.68 5503.74 6322.07
National Hospital (IP) 11147.08 19222.07 22080.12
Private non-profit (OP) 1205.66 1469.69 1575.71
Private non-profit hospital (IP) 6058.83 7385.68 7918.45
Private for-profit clinic (OP) 1297.23 1581.32 1695.39
Private for-profit clinic (IP) 18116.97 22084.49 23677.56
Private for-profit hospital (OP) 2952.34 3598.89 3858.50
Private for-profit hospital (IP) 20606.13 25118.76 26930.71
Table 4 Key variables for sensitivity analysis to ensure sustainability
Scenario Strategy for sustainability
Contributory scenario 1) Formal sector contributions increased from 2.4% at the baseline to 6% then 7.5%, 8% and finally 11% of gross pay
from 2019 onwards.
2) Pensioners’ contributions were varied from 2.4 to 4% and finally 5% of pensions from 2019 onwards.
3) Annual subsidies were put at KSh 4500 per exempted person at the baseline and reached KSh 15000 per exempted
person within a decade.
4) Annual contributions from the informal sector were started at KSh 2000 at the baseline and increased to KSh 3401
in 2023 and KSh 4536 in 2030 per insured adult, child and principal contributor.
5) Administrative costs were varied from 12% of total revenue at the baseline to 11, 10 and 8% by 2023 and 7% from
2024 onwards.
Non-contributory scenario 1) Same as 1–3 above.
2) All informal sector workers and indigent populations were exempted. Cost per exempted is the same for all
scenarios but the difference is that in the contributory scenario has fewer exemptions (indigents only) while the
contributory scenario has both informal sector and indigents exempted. This has important implications on amounts
of revenues generated.
3) Administrative costs reduced from 12% to stay at 5% throughout the simulation.
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Based on the benchmarks in Table 5, the modelling re-
sult shows marked differences between contributory and
non-contributory scenarios especially in the total number
of inpatient days. At the baseline, both scenarios have
132.9 million annual OP visits, which in the 10th year
(2023) increase to 231.7 million and 239.1 million visits
for contributory and non-contributory scenarios, respect-
ively. This difference in numbers between the two scenar-
ios is due to the fact that the non-contributory scenario
reached universal status (97% coverage) as opposed to the
contributory scenario where only 54% of the population is
covered by 2023. However, the differences in OP visits
between the two scenarios is minimal for the insured
(4.20 visits per capita per annum) and the uninsured (3.80
per capita per annum) in 2023. The differences are much
greater for inpatient services (0.35 inpatient days per
capita per year for insured versus 0.18 for uninsured).
Health insurance revenue and expenditure (Constant prices)
Utilization rates and unit costs are major drivers of ex-
penditure. The more people that are covered the more
money is required to meet the expenditure. In total, bar-
ring any cost-containment measures, Fig. 1 indicates that
the contributory scenario in 2030 would generate KSh 395
billion in revenues compared to about KSh 619 billion in
expenditure. The non-contributory scenario, on the other
hand, would have about KSh 505 billion in revenues com-
pared to about KSh 706 billion in expenditure.
There is higher expenditure over a period of time under
the non-contributory scenario than there is in the con-
tributory scenario because of the higher number of people
covered in the former scenario. The gap in expenditure
between the two scenarios is however, narrowed at the
end of the simulation because both have achieved near-
universal population coverage and costs and utilization
levels are the same. Noting that the non-contributory sce-
nario was financially unsustainable (had higher expend-
iture than revenue) from the beginning as opposed to the
contributory scenario which lasted a few years before
running into deficits (Fig. 1), it implies that government
subsidies for the informal sector and indigent populations
as modelled are insufficient and would have to be
increased for revenue to match or exceed expenditure.
Analysis of expenditures per capita (Figs. 2 and 3) sug-
gest that a non-contributory scenario would cost less over-
all with total health expenditure (THE) per capita at
health facilities coming to about KSh 15,700 (US$ 157) at
the end of the simulation compared to about KSh 16,200
(US$ 162) for the contributory scenario. Although the dif-
ferences in THE per capita are not statistically significant
(P = 0.323), there are important budgetary implications
with any slight cost variations over the long term. Private
health expenditure per capita reduces rapidly in the non-
contributory scenario from KSh 1985 at the baseline to
KSh 59 by 2030. On the other hand, private spending in
the contributory scenario steadily reduces from KSh 1985
per capita at the baseline to KSh 703 per capita at the end
of the simulation. Government (non-health insurance) ex-
penditure per capita is higher in the contributory than in
the non-contributory scenario, which partly contributes to
the overall higher THE in the contributory scenario. It
indicates that the government would have to spend more
money in non-health insurance areas to support a con-
tributory scenario. However, overall the non-contributory
scenario has higher total government subsidies for health
insurance because of the large population that is
exempted from contributions and because government
subsidies would need to be at a rate higher than the infor-
mal sector would have been able to personally contribute
in premiums under the contributory scenario.
Sensitivity analysis: strategies to sustainably finance UHC
for each scenario
The two scenarios have large deficits a few years into
implementation and are therefore unsustainable under
prevailing levels of contributions and subsidies. Both
scenarios can be sustainable but there is a limit to which
contribution rates or taxes can be increased to ensure
that revenues match or exceed expenditure. Therefore,
the scenario that breaks even at the lowest cost is the
most viable option for UHC. The study explored the
option of increasing both premium contributions and
government subsidies to ensure that revenues match
expenditure at the lowest cost. The rationale for all the
adjustments was to ensure that expenditures are not
more than revenues for either scenario. The deficits to
be addressed were not categorized and stepwise adjust-
ments were done. The scenario that broke even at the
lowest cost was considered the least expensive even
though other factors not considered in this study could
be at play. Annual subsidies were put at KSh 4500 per
exempted person at the baseline and reached KSh 15000
per exempted person within a decade. Because there
were more exempted people under the non-contributory
scenario than were in the contributory scenario, the
revenue potential for the non-contributory scenario is
higher than for the contributory scenario.
Table 5 Annual utilization of outpatient and inpatient services
(2013–2030)
Baseline 2023 2030
Outpatient visits per capita 3.10 4.00 4.31
Insured 3.26 4.21 4.54
Uninsured 2.93 3.78 4.07
Inpatient day per capita 0.25 0.27 0.29
Insured 0.33 0.35 0.38
Uninsured 0.17 0.18 0.20
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With adjusted levels of contributions and subsidies, a
non-contributory scenario shows considerable sustain-
ability throughout the simulation with total revenue
exceeding total expenditure by about KSh 67 billion in
2030 (Fig. 4).
The main reason for sustainability in a non-contributory
mechanism is the large amounts of government subsidies
paid into the pooling and purchasing institution on behalf
of informal sector and indigent populations. However,
total government subsidies are only 58% of the total health
insurance revenue with total contributions from formal
sector workers and pensioners accounting for about 41%
of the total health insurance revenue. The contributory
scenario, on the other hand, even with increased contribu-
tion rates is unsustainable after 2021 with total expend-
iture exceeding total revenues by about KSh 74.8
billion by 2030 (Fig. 5).
The reason for the differences in revenue and expenditure
is that whereas contributions from the formal and informal
sector workers are high (91% of total revenues), government
subsidies are very low at only 8.20% of total revenue.
Discussion
The goal of UHC has relevance to all countries. All coun-
tries want to reduce the gap between need and utilization
of health services, improve financial protection and quality
Fig. 2 Health expenditure patterns: projections for non-contributory scenario. [Government non-health insurance expenditure: Costs such as reserves
and administrative costs, among others. They are not directly used in the production of health]
Fig. 1 Health insurance revenue and expenditure
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of services for all citizens [11]. In reforming health sys-
tems to address these key issues, countries should give
particular attention to the financing functions, to ensure
that the most efficient, equitable and sustainable means of
financing the health system are adopted.
The results indicate that the non-contributory scenario
has the potential to generate higher total revenues
throughout the simulation. This is because contributions
from the informal sector under the contributory scenario
are very limited (at KSh6000 per household at baseline)
compared to what the government pays in subsidies on
behalf of this population group (KSh15000 at baseline)
under the non-contributory scenario. This implies that in
circumstances where informal sector workers would be
required to contribute, the revenue generated would be
minimal as contributions are not based on amounts that
can finance a given package of care but rather on the eco-
nomic circumstances in the informal sector. Second, as
noticeable in the second year of implementing the non-
contributory scenario, revenues dramatically increased be-
cause the government puts in more money in subsidies
for informal sector and indigent populations as opposed
to the gradual increments in contributions from informal
sector workers in the contributory scenario.
In theory, both models (contributory and non-
contributory) can provide sustainable health financing
options for UHC. In practice, the contributory scenario
in particular, poses serious challenges in contexts with a
large informal sector. The results presented in this paper
suggest that the contributory scenario would be (i) more
Fig. 3 Health expenditure patterns: projections for contributory scenario
Fig. 4 Sustainable financing: non-contributory scenario
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costly than the non-contributory scenario for same level
of utilization among the insured); (ii) much slower than
the non-contributory scenario in advancing population
coverage; (iii) contribute to inequities in financing and
utilization. The inequities in utilization would persist
until the entire population is covered but in the mean-
time, those already covered would be enjoying higher
utilization rates than those not covered. In terms of
financing, inequity is unavoidable especially in the infor-
mal sector where, in absolute figures, the contributions
are flat-rated, which constitute regressive financing.
Previous studies indicate that implementation of a con-
tributory financing mechanism in countries with large
informal sector is costly and problematic if not outright
impossible because of the difficulties associated with
identifying those who should contribute and collecting
premiums in the sector [7, 12].
Even if the informal sector were organized to make
revenue collection possible under a contributory mech-
anism, the results indicate that for revenues and expend-
iture to break even, the premium contribution rates for
both formal and informal sector populations would have
to drastically increase. Increases in contribution rates
are likely to further complicate efforts to implement a
contributory financing mechanism, and may exclude the
poor, in a context where mechanisms to target the poor
are not well developed. Increasing premium rates, for
example from 2.4 to 11% of gross salaries, is likely to
face resistance from the public because there is already
extensive resistance to the prevailing NHIF rates both
from employers and contributors [13]. It is also note-
worthy that any increase in contribution rates should be
carefully assessed in terms of the burden it will place on
contributors. However, the contribution rates should be
realistic in terms of financing a given package of ser-
vices. Granted, an affordable benefit package should be
defined, but the package needs to be comprehensive
enough to protect service users from financial risks. The
reality in the Kenyan context is that the current pre-
mium rates under the NHIF are quite low averaging
2.4% of gross pay for formal sector workers yet the
revised benefit package is very generous, which raises
concerns about the sustainability of the NHIF. As Kenya
embarks on the UHC journey, it is important that the
benefit package offered to the population can be
financed adequately from the total available resources.
Less government subsidies and more contributions
from the informal sector in the contributory model is
counterintuitive because the flat-rate premiums are un-
affordable to most low-income groups. Although data
from OECD countries indicate that government subsid-
ies may be as low as 5.0% of total health expenditure in
contributory systems [14], the Kenyan case is different
because the majority of potential contributors are in the
informal sector where incomes are not only low but dif-
ficult to target in a contributory health financing system.
There is a limit to which premium rates in the contribu-
tory scenario can be increased to ensure sustainability.
At 2.4% of gross pay, there were serious resistance to
new NHIF contributions [13]; at 11% of gross pay as
suggested by the model, the contributory system still
cannot raise revenues that match expenditure. Such an
increase is also likely to face very stiff resistance from
the population and unlikely to be implemented.
Therefore, under the contributory financing approach,
for revenue and expenditure to break even, the govern-
ment needs to significantly increase its subsidies both
for the indigent and for those who could make some
Fig. 5 Sustainable financing: contributory scenario
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contribution but only a small amount. In essence, in-
creasing premium contribution rates to a level that reve-
nues match expenditure would be counterproductive;
would be unaffordable and likely to cause resistance
from the entire population and each time will have to be
strongly justified to be effected if at all.
Given the aforementioned challenges with a contribu-
tory approach to UHC, the Kenyan government should
consider the non-contributory approach as an alternative
option for moving towards UHC. For historical reasons
and the perception that tax revenues alone cannot fi-
nance UHC, many governments in developing countries
are in favor of contributory schemes [4, 5, 8, 15]. How-
ever, recent evidence [16, 17] suggests that the non-
contributory approach could be the best option to make
progress toward UHC in many developing countries that
are characterized by large informal sector populations.
Moreover, a centrally managed non-contributory health
financing system has considerable potential to promote
equity across geographic regions and socioeconomic
groups [18]. The modelling results indicate very rapid
population coverage, which is indicative of achievement
of equity in service coverage for the large majority of the
population over a short period of time. Although the
pace of extending population coverage in the non-
contributory model is overly ambitious, coverage exten-
sion would be far slower in a contributory approach in
the Kenyan context. Besides, most revenue would be
from direct and indirect taxes, both of which are gener-
ally progressive especially in low-income countries [19].
The key issue for Kenya is whether there is political
will to pursue this option, because no matter how
evidence-based and technically sound the proposal for a
non-contributory financing approach is, successful im-
plementation will be dictated by the political context
[11] and the priority given to the health sector. First, the
past and current trends in health sector funding suggest
that the health sector receives less priority in budget al-
location compared to other social sectors. Unless there
is government commitment to UHC through the non-
contributory approach it is unlikely that Kenya will
achieve UHC by 2030 as projected by the government.
Second, with the recent devolution, county governments
not only have semi-autonomous governance systems but
also independent control of respective budgets and have
expressed the desire to run their health programs ac-
cording to their own designs. While devolution creates
opportunities to take services to the people and poten-
tially improve efficiency and accountability, it poses chal-
lenges for pooling. Thus the design of health financing
reforms in Kenya should carefully consider the political
context and the governance structures to minimize frag-
mentation and support financial risk protection and ac-
cess to needed, quality health care for all Kenyans.
Recommendations for additional revenue to finance UHC
under non-contributory mechanism
The non-contributory financing approach seems to be
the most viable option for Kenya under the prevailing
circumstances. This approach requires very heavy finan-
cial commitments and it is important to consider where
such large funding is likely to come from to allow for
large government subsidies to the health sector. A num-
ber of sources could be assessed as potential avenues to
increase fiscal space for health care in Kenya including
shifting expenditure from other government functions to
the health sector, increasing health insurance premium
rates as well as tax rates, exploring a number of innova-
tive financing strategies, and improving efficiency in rev-
enue collection and use of available resources.
Increasing general tax and dedicated tax rates may
look unavoidable under the circumstances of ex-
penditure outstripping revenue to make financing un-
sustainable. However, the current pattern of government
spending suggests that before considering increased
taxes or premium rates there is the possibility of in-
creased government funding for the health sector under
prevailing budgetary conditions mainly by shifting fund-
ing from other government sectors to the health sector.
Expenditure by functions of government suggest that
Kenya devotes large proportions of the budget on func-
tions other than health care (general public services
(17%), economic affairs (22%), defense (5.3%) and public
order and safety (7.6%) [20]). The EU comparably spends
lower on these functions with a large budget for health
care (general public services (14%), economic affairs
(8.8%), defense (2.9%) and public order and safety (3.8%)
[21]). The expenditure by function strongly indicates
that Kenya can possibly re-evaluate its expenditure on
various government functions with the view to giving
greater priority than at present to the health sector along
the lines of developing countries with UHC systems. A
comparative analysis with developing countries such as
Ghana, Rwanda, Costa Rica, Brazil and Thailand, which
have all taken steps to move towards UHC, indicates
that Kenya ranks worst in terms of key health expenditure
indicators. Noting that total government expenditure in
Kenya accounts for 31% of its GDP, well above those of
countries such as Costa Rica and Thailand which have
universal health systems [22, 23], it should be a question
of more priority to the health sector rather than taking the
first and more difficult option of increasing tax rates.
Innovations in financing including non-tax sources
such natural resources, levies on mobile phone compan-
ies, tax on international money transfers and surcharge
on VAT, among others, are potential additional sources
of revenue for the health sector [2, 24]. The latter is
often considered in countries with large informal sectors
given that all residents pay some VAT.
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Further commitment to financing UHC would be dem-
onstrated if the government could honor the Abuja obli-
gation of allocating at least 15% of the national budget to
the health sector. The Abuja target is not a guarantee for
adequate financing and service delivery and should be
interpreted within specific contexts. Alternatively, the gov-
ernment could spend at least 5% of GDP on healthcare
from domestic resources. The 5% of GDP is the financial
estimate required to adequately finance UHC [16]. A
Ministry of Health (MOH) Taskforce [25] estimated that
KSh 217 billion (about US$ 2.17 billion) would be ad-
equate to provide necessary health services to all Kenyans
as of 2013. Based on the analysis of Kenya’s GDP and
national budgets from 2013 to 2016 and going by the task-
force recommendation, spending the equivalent of 5% of
GDP or 15% of the national budget would mobilize more
than adequate resources to fund UHC in Kenya. The re-
sults of the simulation under the non-contributory sce-
nario indicates that the amounts required to finance UHC
in 2014, 2015 and 2016 would be KSh 220.8, 239.6 and
246.6 billion, respectively. These amounts are closer to the
5% of the GDP or 15% of the budget and slightly higher
than the MOH estimates. These are tangible options for
raising adequate revenue for UHC in Kenya and should be
aggressively pursued by advocacy groups, policy makers
and the political leadership.
Future research needs could focus on ways to improve
efficiency in revenue collection especially under the con-
text of devolution as well as the analysis of fiscal
space with special attention to the health sector. Further
research could focus on modeling current health finan-
cing policy for UHC.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that to raise adequate revenues to
finance UHC, the health sector requires substantial fi-
nancial input to be able to provide access to quality
health services with financial protection for all. It is
noteworthy that any mandatory prepayment in this
context– whether a premium to the NHIF or taxes to
the general government basket– are regarded as
‘government funding’ (e.g. both are included in govern-
ment expenditure on health measures in national health
accounts). So whether contributory or non-contributory,
increased mandatory prepayment funding is required. In
this context, efforts towards increasing fiscal space for
health are required. In Kenya, the government is in favor
of a contributory financing system for UHC. However,
given the structure of the labor force such an approach
may not be feasible. Furthermore, under the proposed
contributory arrangement, there is considerable silence
over how to effectively identify groups falling below a
certain income threshold for subsidies and whether there
will be steps to formalize labor. In many other contexts,
identifying the poor for subsidies has proven difficult in
and is unlikely to be successful in Kenya.
The benefits of adopting a non-contributory financing
approach, although more expensive at the beginning than
the contributory mechanism, are clear in the long-term.
The non-contributory mechanism comes at a lower over-
all cost than a contributory approach. The associated high
start-up costs may be addressed through shifting expend-
iture from other sectors of the government, innovative
financing, improving efficiency in spending including
curbing corruption and other leakages as well as initiating
phased coverage of specific services. It is noteworthy that
there are human resources for health (HRH) deficits in
Kenya and while facility capacity might meet the health
needs of a large percentage of the population covered
under a non-contributory scenario in 2 years, the HRH
deficits will be much tougher to resolve in 12-24 months.
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